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Incentives and static and dynamic gains from
market reform: rice production in Vietnam
{
Tuong Nhu Che, Tom Kompas and Neil Vousden*
This article develops a dynamic model to account for the enhanced incentive e¡ects
that result from market reform through a move toward private property rights
and competitive markets. Reform is captured through an emerging pro¢ts function
which depends on e¡ective prices and incentives to work harder. Static and
dynamic output gains from reform are derived through increases in total factor
productivity and induced capital accumulation. The model is applied to rice
production in Vietnam over the period 1976^94. The more extensive is market
reform, the larger the e¡ects found on rice output, the capital stock and
transitional growth rates, suggesting that incentives and more competitive markets
matter greatly.
1. Introduction
In the past two decades, a number of transitional economies have
experienced impressive increases in output through the process of trade
liberalisation. This article develops a dynamic model in which these gains are
largely explained by the enhanced incentive e¡ects that result from
institutional change and market reform, in the form of a move toward
private property rights and competitive markets. The model is applied to the
case of rice production in Vietnam as a striking example of the e¡ects of
market reform. In a fairly short period of time, Vietnam has gone from being
a large importer of rice and other foodstu¡s, at near subsistence levels of
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University, Canberra.consumption, to now the second largest exporter of rice in the world, all
with virtually no discernible technological change throughout the reform
process.
The model has several important features. To capture the e¡ect of
enhanced incentives through time, and following the static representations
contained in McMillan et al. (1989) and Che et al. (2000), an e¡ort variable
is introduced and an associated measure of the e¡ective contribution of
labour to output in terms of e¤ciency units is de¢ned. The e¡ort variable is
broadly interpreted to include everything that determines the quality of the
farmer's labour as well as the willingness to literally exert more e¡ort due to
the enhanced incentives that accompany market reform. In simple terms,
the argument is that market reform results in incentives to work harder and
to work more e¤ciently.
The process of market reform itself is captured through the e¡ects of
changes in policy and market parameters on average per unit pro¢ts. There
are two things to consider here. First, in transitional economies the share of
output that accrues to the state authority varies under di¡erent institutional
settings, from communal systems to share-contracting schemes and ¢nally to
private competitive markets with taxes on retained earnings. Prices received
by farmers for their product also vary considerably across these regimes. To
capture such changes this article estimates an e¡ective output price (the
farmer's share of output multiplied by the actual output price) over time.
With market reform it is asserted that both actual and e¡ective prices
increase, and this is certainly true in the case of Vietnam. With the reform
process, in other words, output is directed over time toward markets where
prices are higher and the share of output apportioned to the state
government for centrally directed distribution falls.
Second, in transitional economies factor and product prices generally
increase at di¡erent rates with market reform. In the article this process is
characterised through a weighted-cost share parameter which measures
the ratio of average factor to product prices under various institutional
arrangements. As is true for most transitional economies, and again this is
the case for Vietnam, the value of this share-cost parameter falls with
reform. Changes in factor prices lag behind the increases in product prices
and the result implies that average per unit pro¢ts rise over time. This,
combined with a rising e¡ective price of output, generates the emerging
pro¢ts function developed in the article.
The static representation is then extended to the intertemporal economy.
1
The article develops a dynamic model of a market reform economy in which
1A static version of the model is developed for Vietnam in Che et al. (2000).
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maximise an intertemporal utility function that depends on consumption and
e¡ort. The resulting solution characterises the investment process, where
e¡ort levels and both the path and steady-state value of capital depend on
the extent of market reform. In contrast to standard Ramsey growth models,
the value of the rate of return to capital here depends on average per unit
pro¢ts, and di¡erent market reform regimes result in di¡erent values of the
capital stock and output per capita even if the equilibrium value of the rate
of return is unchanged.
FollowingBaldwin(1992),measuresofstaticanddynamicoutputgainsfrom
reform are also derived. Increases in average per unit pro¢ts result in more
e¡ort and increased values of total factor productivity as a measure of static
gains. With increased e¡ort, the marginal product of capital also increases and
higher rates of return thus imply induced capital accumulation as a dynamic
gain from market reform. Unlike Baldwin (1992), however, each measure now
depends on parameter values for a work^disutility coe¤cient on e¡ort and the
inverse of a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This turns out to
be important and provides a justi¢cation for including the e¡ort variable in the
¢rst place. The relative success of any new market reform regime, in terms of
its e¡ects on growth paths and steady-state values, now depends on the relative
willingness to work harder in response to enhanced incentives and the degree
to which farmers are willing to postpone consumption in response to higher
ratesofreturn. With reform,lowervalues of the work^disutility coe¤cientand
the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution imply larger
increases in total factor productivity and greater steady-state values for output
andratesofgrowthalongatransitionalpath.
The outline of the article is as follows. First, the dynamic emerging pro¢ts
model is set out, then, the technology and the emerging pro¢ts function are
de¢ned. Next, the intertemporal problem for the farmer is solved. The model
is in traditional neoclassical form in the sense that the rate of growth of
labour is taken to be exogenous. Including the e¡ort variable provides the
desired endogeneity of growth paths and steady states in any case.
2 The next
section derives equilibrium growth paths and steady-state values and both
the static and intertemporal form of an `institutional' production function,
used to capture institutional change and market reform, is obtained. Unlike
standard models, the value of total factor productivity is shown to depend
on average per unit pro¢ts and the work^disutility coe¤cient. Static and
2The de¢nition of capital is narrowly de¢ned with the presumption that there are
no signi¢cant `spillovers' in agricultural production for transitional economies. Although
human capital accumulation may also be important in practice, it is omitted from the model
if for no other reason than data limitations.
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the model and standard Ramsey growth models is drawn. A further
comparison with a model without the e¡ort variable underscores the
importance of incorporating e¡ort into the model.
Then the model is applied to the case of rice production in Vietnam over the
period 1976^94. The various transitional periods of market reform are
described and the data sources and relevant estimations are set out. The article
provides two empirical measures of the impact of market reform. A linear
approximation around steady-state values is used to ¢nd the implied rates of
growthinriceoutputfromonestageofmarketreformtothenext.Convergence
times depend on the extent of market reform as does the steady-state value of
capital, rice output and transitional growth in each stage.
3 The more extensive
is the degree of reform, the larger are the e¡ects, suggesting that incentives and
competitive markets matter greatly. The results are con¢rmed in terms of the
precise measures of the static and dynamic output gains from market reform
drawnfromactualdata.Finally,aconclusionisdrawn.
2. An emerging profits model
2.1 Technology and pro¢ts
Following McMillan et al. (1989), let e represent the level of e¡ort of a
typical farmer, so that, for N workers eN is the e¡ective contribution of
labour to output measured in `e¤ciency units'. As mentioned, the value of e
can be broadly interpreted to include everything that determines the quality
of the farmer's labour as well as the willingness to literally exert more e¡ort
due to the enhanced incentives that accompany market reform. Assume a






where Q, L , E, and K represent output, land, material inputs (e.g., fertiliser









where q, l, e, k are output, land, material inputs, and capital per farmer.
In principle, farmers work in di¡erent institutional settings that vary from a
communalsystemtovariousformsofshare-contractingandprivatecompetitive
markets.Torepresentthisletb 2 0;1bethefractionofadditionalrevenuethat
3From the individual farmer's point of view, the lengthy and gradual adjustment to a
new steady-state value of the capital stock is assured by the absence of well-developed
capital markets as typical in transitional economies.
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p; which also varies by institutional setting. The value d is a constant that
represents payments received under a communal system, often regardless of
e¡ort,sothatwhenbequalszeroallproduction(lessd)istransferredtothestate
government. Various share-contracting schemes thus imply that b is a positive
fractionandwhenmarketsareperfectlyprivateandcompetitivebequalsone.In
the latter case, the farmer retains all income and d is clearly zero so that, in this
sense, b is an index that measures both the incentive to work and the fraction of
thevalueofthemarginalproductthatwouldbepaidtothefarmer.
4Anessential
property of the reforms considered in this article is that both b and e¡ective
outputpricesbpincreasewithmarketreform.
Costs depend on an vector of input prices w and the total cost function,
as usual, is de¢ned as:
C  c0W wq 3
where c0 is a constant that depends on the share parameters for inputs in
equation (1) and W w de¢nes the weighted share of input prices. The pro¢t
function is thus:
p  bpq ÿ c0W wq 4
ignoring the communal payment d. As mentioned, in transitional economies,
factor and product prices generally increase at di¡erent rates with market
reform. To capture this, de¢ne m  W w=bp as a weighted-cost share
parameter or the ratio of average factor to e¡ective product prices. The
pro¢t function now becomes:
p  bpq1 ÿ c0m 5
for
t  bp1 ÿ c0m 6
a measure of average per unit pro¢ts. If factor or input prices lag behind
e¡ective output prices with market reform, increases in e¡ective output
prices bp will imply that average per unit pro¢ts t increase and p > 0 along a
transitional path. Equation (5) thus represents an emerging pro¢ts function.
2.2 Capital accumulation and intertemporal optimization
The representative farmer allocates pro¢ts at time t between current
consumption ct and investment It in capital goods, so that:
4This simple representation of the incentive scheme can be thought of as a reduced form
of a more complex system of equations that de¢ne a reward structure. See MacRae (1977)
and Sicular (1988).
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a4 ÿ ct 7
using equations (2) and (5) and the de¢nition of average per unit pro¢ts.
Capital per unit of labour k evolves according to:




a4 ÿ m  nk ÿ ct 8
for n an exogenous rate of growth of the labour force and m the rate of
depreciation. Note that the measure of output per capita depends on the
degree of market reform, or average per unit pro¢ts t and hence e¡ective





a4 would simply be given by q or output per capita, independent
of any market reform.
Assume that farmers receive utility uc;e from consumption but dislike














for s the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution, r
the constant subjective rate of time preference and parameter d > 0. The
value z > 0 is a work^disutility coe¤cient implying that the marginal
disutility of e¡ort increases with e¡ort. The value d is chosen to guarantee
that, roughly speaking, the concavity of uc o¡sets the convexity of ue so
that Uct;et is jointly concave.
The representative farmer chooses consumption and e¡ort levels et at
each point in time to maximise equation (9) subject to equation (8) and an
initial condition k0  k0. E¡ective output prices bp are parametric to the
farmer. First-order necessary conditions are:
ct










a4ÿ1  cm  n  r 12




a4 ÿ m  nk ÿ ct 13
for ct the co-state variable or `shadow price' of capital. As usual, equation
(10) states that output will be allocated to investment up to the point where
the loss of current utility from a unit of current consumption foregone equals
the increase in utility over all future periods from an extra unit of capital
today. Equation (11) simply requires that the marginal product of e¡ort
equals the marginal disutility of e¡ort. Most importantly, from equations
(11) and (13), market reform or increases in average per unit pro¢ts t imply
both more e¡ort and larger transitional growth rates.
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a4ÿ1 ÿ m  n  r
 
14
or the proportional rate of growth of consumption. Using equations














m  n  r 15
and






za4=n ÿ m  nk ÿ ct 16
for n  z ÿ a1; for convenience. The ¢rst term in brackets on the right-hand
side of equation (14) is a market reform `augmented value' of the marginal
product of capital, stating that consumption increases over time only when
the real return to capital per farmer (i.e., the reform augmented marginal
product of capital net of depreciation and population growth) exceeds the
rate of time preference.
Setting _ c  _ k  0 and solving gives:
c
  k















for the steady-state value of per-capita consumption c
 and capital per
farmer k







for c normalised to one in equation (11).
5 Multiplying by N and substituting
this value of e
 into the `technical' production function, equation (1), and
solving yields:
5The normalisation is appropriate only in the sense that the measure of static and
dynamic output gains from market reform (to follow) is derived by writing equation (20) in
logarithmic form, with a variation in average per unit pro¢ts t. All constant terms, including
c  c
ÿs; drop out. The linear approximation proceeds directly in terms of equations (15)
and (16), without the normalisation, and accordingly rede¢nes (20) as an optimal inter-
temporal production function. See equation (43). Equations (19)^(21) are also solutions to a
static problem for an optimal value of e
 obtained from maximising a utility function
up;e: See McMillan et al. (1989).
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for g1  za1 ÿ a1=n; g2  za2=n; g3  za3=n and g4  za4=n; where:
At  a0ta0da1
a1=zÿa1 21
for again n  z ÿ a1. Equation (20) is the exact counterpart to the static
`institutional' production function contained in McMillan et al. (1989), and
clearly depends on institutional setting. Note as well that both total factor
productivity At and e¡ort e now depend on the extent of market reform or
average per unit pro¢ts t:
2.4 Static and dynamic gains from market reform
Following Baldwin (1992), focus on paths and steady-state comparisons in
terms of the e¡ects of a change in average per unit pro¢ts in the above
model. There are two things to consider. An increase in t a¡ects the level of
total factor productivity At as a static output gain from market reform,
but it also a¡ects the value of the steady state capital^labour ratio k
 in
equation (18), with an induced capital accumulation e¡ect along a
transitional path. A higher value for k
 implies a larger value for output per
capita and thus a dynamic output gain from market reform.
To see this, consider ¢rst the simple Baldwin (1992) case. Let output per
capita be represented by q  fk;t; so that in steady state c
  fk
;t for a
given level of market reform and rk
;t  r  m  n; for r the rate of return
to capital as a function of k and t. A change in average per unit pro¢ts t


















As Baldwin (1992, p. 164) argues, the second term in equation (22) captures
the usual static output gain, while the ¢rst term re£ects the induced capital
accumulation e¡ect. If market reform (or an increase in t) induces capital
accumulation through a higher value of the rate of return r, the static output
e¡ect is enhanced.
The relevant decomposition is especially clear for the simple expression
Q  bK
ay: Di¡erentiating in log-form with respect to t implies that:
^ Q  ^ b 
a  y
1 ÿ a ÿ y
^ b 23
as in Baldwin (1992, p. 168), where the circum£ex indicates a percentage
change. The static output e¡ect is given by ^ b and the dynamic output
e¡ect as a result of induced capital accumulation is a multiple of this
term.
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as a function of both k and t. The variation @r=@k is less than zero if
g4  za4=n  za4=z ÿ a1 is less than one and @r=@t is greater than zero if
z ÿ a1 is positive. If so, market reform induces capital accumulation
through an increase in average per unit pro¢ts t. To form a decomposition
between static and dynamic e¡ects, write equation (18), or the steady-state





where the term Bt now captures all of the constants in equation (18). Static
e¤ciency requires that equation (20) holds at each point along an optimal







for At a function of average per unit pro¢ts, given by equation (21).












The ¢rst term on the right-hand side of equation (27) measures static output
gains. Recall that a1 is the share parameter on e¡ective labour units or eN:
If z ÿ a1 > 0; proportional increases in t; or larger average per-unit pro¢ts,
result in more e¡ort and an increase in output through an increase in
measured total factor productivity At: The second term in equation (27)
captures dynamic output gains from market reform.
6 If e¡ort increases with
average per unit pro¢ts t; as it must from equations (11) or (19), for g4 a
positive fraction and z ÿ a1 > 0, the marginal product of capital will also
be larger. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (27) in fact
now requires (with parameter restrictions) that the rate of return to capital
rk;t rises with average per unit pro¢ts t: Market reform thus induces
capital accumulation and a¡ects both the transitional growth path, see
equation (16), and the steady-state value of the capital^labour ratio given by
equation (18).
6In per capita form, this term is exactly g4_ k=k or the contribution of increases in the
capital^labour ratio to increases in output per capita.
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Before considering the case of Vietnam, it is useful to draw some
comparisons between the model above and standard Ramsey models. Recall
¢rst that the optimal motion for consumption in a typical growth model







0k ÿ m  n  r 28
and in steady state the condition:
rk
  m  n  r 29
determines, with regularity, a unique value of the capital^labour ratio k
;
for given constants m  n  r. This is not the case for the model above and
most importantly so. With equations (15) and (24), the steady-state rate of
return is now:
rk;t  m  n  r 30
as a function of both the capital^labour ratio k and average per unit pro¢ts
t. As described above, increases in average per unit pro¢ts result in an increase
in rate of return and thus induced capital accumulation. With increases in
the capital^labour ratio, the rate of return again falls along a transitional path
and since m  n  r is constant, the rate of return r must eventually reach
the same steady-state value. However, the value of the capital^labour ratio
will now be larger in steady state. In fact, this is the point. Di¡erent market
reform regimes result in di¡erent values of the steady state capital^labour
ratio k
 and thus di¡erent values for output and consumption per capita.
7
Such a connection cannot be obtained in equation (29) since k
 is uniquely
determined, independent of market reform parameters.
Next, to highlight the importance of e¡ort e; consider a comparison
between the model above and a comparable system with the e¡ects of market
reform (or changes in t); but without the e¡ort variable. To see this,
maximise equation (9) with e  0, subject to:
_ k  ta0l
a2e
a3k
a4 ÿ m  nk ÿ ct 31









a4ÿ1 ÿ m  n  r
 
32
and the steady-state value of capital is now simply:
7It is easy to show that @r=@k < 0 and @q=@k > 0 are both necessary for the motions given
by equations (15) and (16) to saddlepoint stable. This is con¢rmed by the sign of the
determinant value of the coe¤cient matrix given by equation (A1) in the appendix.
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m  n  r
 1=1ÿa4
33
where (recall) a4 is the share parameter for k. It is clear from equation (32)
that the market reform `augmented value' of the marginal product of capital
(the ¢rst term in brackets), or rk;t; is still a function of the capital^labour
ratio and average per unit pro¢ts t. But compare equations (18) and (33).
By examining the coe¤cients in the exponential terms, and noting that
g4  za4=z ÿ a1; it is easy to see that:
1







whenever s > a4: The opposite of course holds for s < a4: A similar
restriction applies for transitional paths. Using equations (18) and (33) in
logarithmic form, and di¡erentiating with respect to t; gives relative pro-












for s < 1.
8 In other words, for 1 > s > a4, the model with an e¡ort variable,
compared to one without, results in a lower steady-state value for capital
and faster transitional paths. But all of this is exactly what one would expect
and want. The use of e incorporates an extra and important degree of
endogeneity in the model, so that paths and steady states depend on the size
(indirectly) of the e¡ort^disutility coe¤cient z, or the relative willingness to
work harder in response to enhanced incentives and the degree to which
farmers are willing to postpone consumption in response to higher rates of
return, or the value of the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution s. In terms of the dynamics, the relative e¡ects of z and s cannot
be captured in the model without an e¡ort variable, or in Baldwin's (1992)
measure of dynamic gains from market reform, equation (23).
9
8Multiplying both sides of equation (35) by a4 gives dynamic gains from market reform.
Multiplying 1=1 ÿ a4 by a4 is also exactly the second term on the right-hand side of
equation (23) for a  y  a4, as in Baldwin (1992).
9In any event, it is clear from equation (27) that for any non-negative value of the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution s there will be substantial dynamic gains from
market reform, including the case in which s > a4; and this is the e¡ect that is emphasised
throughout the article. Simulations on the linear approximation (details are available from
the authors on request) for values of s from 0.1 to 10, show (as expected) that the length of
time of convergence to a steady state increases with s but, most importantly, the e¡ects of
di¡erent values of s are relatively insigni¢cant to the resulting rate of growth in rice output
along a transitional path. This is con¢rmed by the sensitivity results for the work^disutility
coe¤cient z on the measure of the dynamic output gains e¡ect.
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reform. Recall that this measure is given by ^ ta1=z ÿ a1. Including an e¡ort
variable in the model thus implies that both the measures of static gains from
reform and total factor productivity At; given by equation (21), depend
on z or the work^disutility coe¤cient for e¡ort. Not only is this crucial for
the empirical results to follow, since changes in average per unit pro¢ts t or
market reform can now be nicely represented by changes in total factor
productivity, in an otherwise traditional manner, but including an e¡ort
variable (once again) also captures an important parameter e¡ect. An
increase in the work^disutility coe¤cient z implies that work is more
`disagreeable' and as such is partly a measure of the curvature of the utility
function, see equation (9). For any given proportional increase in average
per unit pro¢ts ^ t; higher values of z thus result in both lower values of
measured At and static gains from market reform. An increase in t clearly
results in more e¡ort, but the impact of any new market reform regime, in
terms of increases in output, also clearly depends on the relative willingness
to work. None of this can be shown in the model without an e¡ort
variable.
10
4. Market reform and rice production in Vietnam
4.1 Transitional periods
The model above is now applied to the case of rice production (by far, the
most signi¢cant agricultural industry) in Vietnam. The relevant market
reform or transitional periods that correspond to the available data can be
divided into: (a) the communal system (1975^80); (b) output contracts
(1981^87); and (c) trade liberalisation (1988^94). The overall process is
characterised by a move from public ownership and central planning to a
form of private property and more competitive markets, with enhanced
incentives to produce more and more e¤ciently. In broad terms, under the
communal system virtually all rice production was located in compulsory
agricultural collectives, with all farm activities, including the choice of
inputs, designated by state-planning authorities. After harvest, a portion of
output was extracted by the central government. The remainder was required
by law to be sold in state markets at low state prices (roughly 20^30 per cent
of the estimated market price). Small private plots were allowed but only
for the household consumption of subsidiary agricultural goods, other than
10Compare Baldwin's (1992) measure or the ¢rst term on the right-hand side of equation
(23). Numerical estimates show that the measure of static gains is in fact quite sensitive to
changes in the work^disutility coe¤cient z.
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distribution of rice within the commune was based on egalitarian criteria. As
an apparent result of these controls, the output of rice fell markedly and
especially so over the period 1977^80, forcing Vietnam to import large
amounts of rice to meet domestic demand.
The period of output contracts corresponds to a move to decollectivise
agriculture. Plots of land were allocated to prior members of the commune
and farmers were allowed to organise production activities privately, in what
e¡ectively was a tentative ¢rst move towards private property rights.
Although, for the most part, rice was still required to be sold in state markets
at low state prices, private domestic markets (for some portion of output
sold, roughly 20 per cent) inevitably emerged and were condoned by state
authorities. In fact, the period is generally characterised by a `dual price'
system (a low state price and a competitive market price), albeit with strict
controls to prevent arbitrage opportunities between markets.
The period of trade liberalisation ¢nally allowed for e¡ective private
property rights over both land (initially 10^15 year leases) and capital
equipment. Production decisions were further decentralised, all farm income
(after tax) was retained by the farmer and in 1990 the central government
abolished the dual price system. Rice could now be sold on competitive
domestic markets with an incentive structure that rewarded individual e¡ort.
In 1993 tenure arrangements over land were extended (to 20-year leases),
provisions for the exchanging of leases and the sale of land were introduced
and farmers (through voluntary cooperatives) could now sell rice freely in
international markets.
As a whole, the e¡ects of market reform on rice production are striking,
with the more pervasive the degree of liberalisation, the higher the rate of
growth of rice output. Table 1 shows this clearly.
11 Although rice output has
increased steadily over the periods of market reform, the growth rate of rice
output is signi¢cantly higher in the second stage of reform, or the period of
trade liberalisation. Labour inputs have increased slowly over time and sown
Table 1 Rice production in Vietnam, annual growth rates (%)
Period Output Labour Land
Material
inputs Capital TFP
1976^80 0.4 0.4 ÿ0.8 ÿ1.1 2.2 0.6
1981^87 4.6 0.2 ÿ1.3 2.9 2.5 3.8
1988^94 6.1 1.3 ÿ0.5 5.6 10.6 3.6
11For data sources and estimations see pp. 560^3 and the notes to table 5.
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although clearly important, have grown more slowly than output in
each period, while investment has increased dramatically from 1988 to 1994,
apparently accounting for a good part of the high rates of growth in output
during the trade liberalisation period. Indeed, not only does this period
roughly correspond to the extension of private property rights over capital
goods, which undoubtedly is a contributory factor, but the increase in the
rate of growth of capital is also fully consistent with an induced capital
accumulation e¡ect that goes with the enhanced incentives to produce rice
with market reform. The last column of table 1 shows the annual growth
rates for total factor productivity (TFP), calculated in the usual way as
Solow residuals. In all stages TFP exhibits positive growth, but note this
measure (given At in equation (21) above) will partly depend on the extent
of market reform or average per unit pro¢ts t: Part of the exercise to follow
involves a further decomposition of TFP to account for the static and
dynamic gains that result from a change in t.
4.2 Data sources and estimations
Data for rice output and inputs are drawn from 53 provinces in Vietnam
and partly based on original data sets constructed by the GSO (1995), the
SPC (1995), the MAFI (1995), the SDP (1995), the World Bank (1994,
1995), SRF (1994) and the SDAFF. All results for the 53 provinces are
reported in extensive tabular form in Che (1997) and form the basis of the
¢rst ¢ve columns (by year) of table 4. Since table 4 is expressed in terms of
growth indexes for all variables, table 5 lists the actual data for aggregate
rice output and inputs in Vietnam from 1976^94. Following Tang (1980)
and Sicular (1988), the total value of material inputs is obtained by a
measure of the nutritional content of all fertiliser (organic and chemical),
insecticide and seeds used in rice production. Labour is measured by working
days and is obtained by multiplying the average (per person) working day
per hectare in agriculture by the cultivated rice area, divided by 300 days (or
the standard labour unit in one year). Capital inputs are represented in terms
of tractor-equivalents, with a conversion rate based on known observations
between a bullock-day and a tractor-hour at 15 horsepower.
As above, the value of e¡ective output prices bp depends on institutional
arrangements and is represented here as a vector across all rice producers,
or:
bp  b0pS  b1pM  b2pw 36
where the sum over bi 2 0;1 must equal one. In the communal system,
b0  1 and all output was sold to the state at a low and controlled state price
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tightly regulated (with most of farm output still required to be sold to the
state government at pS), with approximate share values of b0  0:8 and
b1  0:2; and a new (albeit restricted) domestic market price pM: With the
period of trade liberalisation, the state market was abolished, most controls
were removed from the domestic market and international trade was
permitted. Rice output was allocated between domestic and world markets
at higher prices, with the di¡erential between domestic market prices and the
export price pw becoming increasingly smaller.
12 As the reform process pro-
ceeds, in other words, the share of output to the state falls to zero, the share
going to the domestic market initially increases and then starts to fall as
output is exported. As a whole, the process directs output toward markets
where price is higher and the value of e¡ective output prices bp over time
re£ects this fact (see table 2).
The actual measure of prices p used to construct table 2 is the real value
of the average price for rice in Vietnam in terms of a constant value of the
Table 2 Growth indexes for inputs, effective output prices and
average per unit profits t
Growth index value for
Year 1 ÿ C0m bp t
1976^80 100.0 100.0 100.0
1981 100.0 113.9 113.9
1982 100.0 118.3 118.3
1983 100.0 122.0 122.0
1984 100.0 125.6 125.6
1985 107.1 121.4 130.1
1986 107.1 127.4 136.5
1987 108.9 130.7 142.4
1988 108.9 158.6 172.8
1989 114.3 177.3 202.6
1990 116.1 194.3 225.5
1991 123.2 232.7 286.7
1992 125.0 212.1 265.1
1993 123.2 213.1 262.6
1994 121.4 253.8 308.2
Source: Computed from the data set constructed by Che (1997).
12Since Vietnam is currently a natural exporter of agricultural goods, its export price will
exceed its domestic market price under autarky with free internal trade, which in turn will
exceed its domestic price under tightly regulated domestic markets. All prices are higher
than the state-controlled price.
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13 The value of m  W w=bp, or the ratio of average input to
e¡ective output prices, is constructed by measuring the real value (in US
dollars) of input prices in terms of rice units. The resulting values of
1 ÿ c0m; from equation (5), are reported in the ¢rst column of table 2. With
bp and 1 ÿ c0m, values of t, or average per unit pro¢ts, given by equation
(6), can be calculated. The results are listed in the ¢nal column of table 2.
The emerging pro¢ts story holds. The value of t generally rises with the most
substantial gains occurring during the period from 1988^91, or the ¢rst four
years of the period of trade liberalisation.
The input share parameters gi from the `institutional' production,
equation (20), are estimated on cross-sectional data over farms in the 53
provinces of Vietnam for the year 1993, with estimated values g1  0:2;
g2  0:4, g3  0:4; and g4  0:1.
14 Following McMillan et al. (1989), the
e¡ort^disutility coe¤cient z can be calculated directly from equation (21),
by noting that the ratio of the proportional rates of change of At to t is
simply a1=z ÿ a1: On the basis of proportional changes ^ A and ^ t on trials
over successive pairs of dates, and solving simultaneously, the measure of z
ranges between 2.8 and 3.2, with z  3 the most common. Finally, given
the technical relationship (see above) that exists between the `technical' pro-
duction function, equation (1), and the `institutional' production function,
equation (20), the values of each share parameter ai, again solving
simultaneously, are a1  0:3; a2  0:35; a3  0:35; and a4  0:1.
15 The term
13Accordingly, the relevant de£ator for bp is the ratio Dong/$US, which is in line with
the high correlation between the Vietnamese in£ation rate and the value of Dong/$US
reported by the World Bank (1994, pp. 67^8). The use of the US dollar standard (commonly
employed by the Vietnamese people themselves) is due to domestic price instability and
(especially) the often unreliable `o¤cial' estimates of the rate of in£ation by government
agencies. For much of the period in question the Vietnamese authorities still regarded
in£ation as a `capitalist phenomenon', and its measurement generated little interest and was
often poorly constructed.
14See Che (1997) and Che et al. (2000) for further details. The share parameters sum to
slightly more than one, but a Wald-test indicates that the hypothesis of constant returns to
scale cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent level. The assumption of constant returns to scale
in equation (20) is also consistent with the prevailing empirical literature on aggregate
agricultural production functions. For example, see Hayami and Ruttan (1985) for com-
parable estimates for 22 developing countries and Tang (1980) for China. Given the limited
number of years in the data set, time-series estimates of each g are unreliable. As such, it is
assumed that these values are constant throughout the process of market reform, a fact that
basically corresponds to common observation. Given the closed nature of the Vietnamese
society and the lack of resources necessary to purchase such things as new hybrid seeds for
rice, it is generally understood that there was little technological change throughout this
period (1976^94) and nothing close to the `green revolution' that characterises other
transitional economies, save for a few experimental farms in Vietnam. Water use and
irrigation methods also remained relatively unchanged.
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temporal elasticity of substitution s is set at 0:5; the rate of depreciation m
is :015; and the subjective rate of time preference r is 0:01.
16
4.3 Empirical results
Based on the econometric estimates of the share parameters in the `insti-
tutional' production function, the derived share parameters in the `technical'
production function, the measure of inputs, rice output, average per unit
pro¢ts and the calculated value of the work-disutility coe¤cient z; the model
above is now used to account for actual data. Of particular interest is the
induced capital accumulation e¡ect and the values of the static and dynamic
gains from market reform.
A linear approximation
Begin by setting aside, for the moment, the measure of static and dynamic
gains given by equation (27). The idea is to obtain a value for the changes in
the capital stock and rice output given market reform, or a change in average
per unit pro¢ts t; and to ¢nd an implied annual rate of growth in rice output
between steady states. To facilitate the estimation note ¢rst, from equation
(18), and the discussion above, that the steady-state value of the capital^
labour ratio from one stage of market reform j to the next is a simple
multiple, depending on t and parameter values, of the value of k in the
communal system, or:
15The value of c0 in equation (3) is accordingly 1.13a0:
16The precise value of the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution
s for the case of Vietnam is an open empirical issue and worth further study. For developed
economies the estimates of s vary considerably and often depend on prior estimates (and
beliefs) regarding how broad the de¢nition of capital should be. For example, compare
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Hall (1988) and Summers (1982). A relatively low value of
s implies that the representative farmer is more willing to postpone consumption in response
to higher rates of return and this seems to accord with the experience of Vietnam. Even
though the economy is still relatively poor (but growing), estimates of savings rates are very
high. A value for s < 1 implies that the growth rate along a transitional path (see equation
35) is larger for the model with an e¡ort variable than without and this too seems a
reasonable characterisation of Vietnam given the large increases in the capital stock,
especially during the period of trade liberalisation (see table 1). In addition, the restriction
that s < a4 implies that the ratio of c=k will rise over time, a fact consistent with aggregate
data (available from the authors on request) for Vietnam. In any case, in the empirical
results to follow, the e¡ect of variations in s on the rate of growth of rice output and the
dynamic gains to market reform are relatively small. As noted above, as long as s is non-
negative dynamic gains from market reform will still be substantial.
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C is the measure of the capital^labour ratio in the communal system,
as an arithmetic average of the observed values for the years 1976^80. The
value of average per unit pro¢ts t is taken as the last observed value of per
unit pro¢ts in each stage or, for example, its observed value in 1987 for the
period of output contracts. It is implicitly assumed that if a given stage of
market reform were to continue, without interruption or further market
reform, that t would remain roughly unchanged until a steady state is
reached. The resulting estimates for steady-state values of the capital stock
are given in the ¢rst column of table 3.
17
The next step is to calculate the length of time required to reach a close
vicinity of the steady state, for a calculated value of the speed of
convergence. This is done in the usual way by taking a log-linear
approximation to the equations of motion, (15) and (16), around steady-state
values in order to generate numerical solutions of the approximate non-
linear system.





 is the steady-state value of the capital stock for a given size of
the labour force and a is a constant.
However, the value of K
 also depends on the parameter t which varies
across di¡erent periods of market reform, so it is necessary to derive the time
path of capital and the convergence time for each stage of reform separately.
For the period of output contracts, the value of a in equation (38), setting
t  0; is K0 ÿ K

oc  ÿ92:8, for K0 the value of the capital stock
for the communal system (see table 3) and K

oc its value under output









Communal system 245.5 15102.6
Output contracts 338.3 24 18741.5 1.3
Trade liberalisation 674.4 33 47417.9 2.5
17The ratio of tj=tc is approximately 1.43 from the communal system to output contracts
and 3.07 from the communal system to the period of trade liberalisation. See table 2. The
value of the capital stock for the communal system in table 3 is the actual value, averaged
over the years 1976 to 1980.
18See the Appendix for technical details.
564 T.N. Che et al.
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001contracts. The comparable expression for the period of trade liberalisation
is ~ K0 ÿ K

tl  ÿ336:1; where ~ K0 is now the value of the capital stock in
the last year of output contracts (1987), just prior to the shift in regimes, and
K

tl is the capital stock in the period of trade liberalisation. The relevant
reform time paths are thus:
Koct  ÿ92:8e
ÿ0:11t  338:3 39
and
Ktlt  ÿ336:1
ÿ0:11t  674:4 40
with an estimated time of convergence (to at least 99 per cent of the
steady-state value) of 24 years for output contracts and 33 years for the
period of trade liberalisation, as reported in the second column of table 3.
The ¢nal step in the argument is to ¢nd the predicted values of rice output
in each stage of market reform, as if that stage continued to a steady-state
value. From this, implied annual rates of growth in rice output can be
obtained. Using all parameter values, observed variables, and the values of
the capital stock in table 3, equation (20) can be approximated for the level
of rice output, assuming growth rates in all inputs and TFP from one steady-
state to the next. Since, in general, the concern is with level e¡ects and the
resulting growth path, equation (21) now becomes:
At  a0ta0da1




using equations (10) and (17), and equation (20) is thus appropriately
rede¢ned as an optimal intertemporal production function.
For the period of output contracts (1981^87), the available data ends in
1987 but the length of time to convergence is estimated to be 24 years. To
keep things simple, assume that the rate of growth in labour and material
inputs after 1987 is simply the average (actual) growth rate of both variables
over the period 1981^87 (see table 1), or 0.2 and 2.9 per cent. The rate of
growth of land is set equal to zero, which roughly conforms to the data
throughout.
19 The growth rate of total factor productivity At; however, is
more complicated since it depends directly on the e¡ects of market reform or
average per unit pro¢ts t. To make a clear point, focus on the case where
the assumed rate of growth of At is zero after 1987. If so, the remaining
measure of the change in rice output in terms of a change in the capital
component is due simply to induced capital accumulation from a change in t:
In other words, with observed values in 1987 and a zero rate of growth in
At for subsequent years, the resulting growth path due to an increase in t;
19In 1993 the Vietnamese government in fact introduced a regulation banning the
conversion of rice land to other uses.
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or the second term on the right-hand side of equation (27).
20
Given the observed values of rice output, capital, labour, material inputs
(see table 4) and total factor productivity in 1987, using equation (41), the
assumed values for rates of growth over the remaining 17 years for all
variables and the predicted value of the steady-state capital stock for the
period of output contracts (see table 3), equation (20) gives a estimated value
of rice output of 18,741.5 thousand tons. The implied annual rate of growth
(as a ¢tted value of the exponential growth rate) from the observed value
of rice output in 1987 to its estimated steady-state value (in year 2004) is 1.3
per cent per annum. All results are reported in table 3.
A similar procedure is adopted for the period of trade liberalisation
(1988^94). The length of time for convergence is now 33 years and the
assumed average annual growth rates for labour and material inputs after
1994 are 1.3 and 5.6 per cent. Current levels of rice output, all inputs and
total factor productivity in 1994 are taken as the base. The predicted steady-
state value for capital is drawn from table 3 and the rate of growth of At
is again assumed to be zero after 1994. Using equation (20), as above, the
estimated value of rice output (in year 2023) is 47,417.9 thousand tons and
the implied rate of growth is 2.5 per cent per annum.
The results are clear. As table 3 shows, if a given period of market reform
were allowed to persist inde¢nitely to its new steady-state value, the pre-
dicted e¡ect on the level of rice output and its rate of growth is substantial,
even with an assumed zero rate of growth in TFP in each period of reform.
21
Moreover, the more extensive is the degree of market reform, the larger the
e¡ects. The predicted value of rice output under the trade liberalisation
regime is more than 2.5 times larger than that of output contracts and more
20An alternative procedure is to assume that the growth rate in At over the years from
1987 onward is just its average rate of growth for observed values from 1981^87, or 3.8 per
cent. Equation (41) would thus need to be applied directly over this period and the ¢nal
implied rates of growth in rice output would of course be much larger. In any case, setting
the growth rate of At equal to zero for periods after 1987 not only isolates the induced
capital accumulation e¡ect, which is the idea, but it also broadly conforms to observed data.
Table 2 shows that most of the impact of market reform, in terms of changes in t; occurs
in the ¢rst four or ¢ve years of a new market reform regime. If so, using an observed value
of At in 1987 (or 1994 for the trade liberalisation period), and a zero growth rate there-
after, already captures the bulk of the static gains from market reform in this period. In
addition, setting the growth rate of At equal to zero after 1987 (or 1994) is, of course, also
consistent with the manner in which predicted steady-state values of the capital stock are
determined for the period of output contracts and trade liberalisation, as given in table 3.
21The actual growth rates for rice output over the much shorter but observed time
intervals (and presumably points further away from steady-state values), or the periods
1981^87 and 1988^94, were of course much larger. See table 1.
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Growth index value for ( 100 in the period of the communal system, 1976^80)





1976^80 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1981 112.4 104.0 97.2 100.2 114.5 101.5 101.4
1982 130.3 104.8 96.3 103.9 111.9 102.0 101.9
1983 133.5 103.6 95.3 110.1 111.3 102.4 102.3
1984 140.4 103.9 94.3 111.5 114.4 102.8 102.7
1985 143.7 104.9 92.3 114.3 117.2 104.4 104.2
1986 144.9 103.4 91.3 120.5 128.0 105.2 104.9
1987 136.7 102.8 91.1 118.6 119.0 106.0 105.7
1988 153.9 104.2 88.3 126.9 121.6 109.6 109.1
1989 172.0 105.9 88.3 130.4 121.8 113.0 112.3
1990 174.1 107.0 88.3 134.1 120.8 115.5 114.7
1991 177.7 107.7 88.1 139.6 142.9 122.8 121.5
1992 195.5 111.5 88.1 153.4 170.3 120.2 119.1
1993 206.8 110.4 86.8 160.5 209.7 119.9 118.9
1994 213.0 112.1 86.8 178.7 229.0 125.3 124.0
Average annual growth rate (%)
1981^87 4.6 0.2 ÿ1.3 2.9 2.3 0.80 0.70
1988^94 6.1 1.3 ÿ0.5 5.6 10.6 2.30 2.10
























































































































1than 3 times larger than the actual value of rice output (averaged over
1976^80) in the communal system. Average annual growth rates over the
implied path to a steady state almost double between the period of output
contracts and trade liberalisation. In fact, the model predicts that (roughly)
18.7 million tons of rice will be produced in year 2004 under the output
contracts regime, but that target, with the enhanced incentives given by the
period of trade liberalisation, was actually surpassed in 1989 (see table 5).
22
The measure of static and dynamic gains from market reform



























1976 11827.2 764.1 4710.0 2137.6 236.7
1977 10597.1 764.2 4709.8 2129.6 243.8
1978 9789.9 782.1 4664.0 2186.7 237.9
1979 11362.9 786.0 4618.1 2127.7 245.2
1980 11647.4 768.6 4572.3 2026.4 263.7
1981 12415.2 803.8 4526.4 2126.3 281.2
1982 14390.2 810.1 4480.5 2203.5 274.7
1983 14743.3 800.5 4434.6 2336.0 273.2
1984 15505.6 803.4 4388.8 2365.8 280.8
1985 15874.8 810.8 4296.5 2425.4 287.7
1986 16002.9 798.9 4250.0 2556.9 314.2
1987 15102.6 794.3 4242.6 2517.2 292.1
1988 17000.0 805.5 4108.9 2693.2 298.6
1989 18996.3 818.9 4108.0 2766.3 299.1
1990 19225.2 827.4 4108.0 2844.4 296.5
1991 19621.9 832.5 4101.0 2962.6 350.7
1992 21590.3 862.1 4100.0 3254.3 418.1
1993 22836.6 853.1 4038.6 3404.4 514.8
1994 23528.3 866.7 4038.6 3790.4 562.2
Sources: General Statistics O¤ce, Statistics Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, the
General Department of Land Management of Vietnam, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Processing
Industry, Statistics for Rice Farms, and the National Investigation of Rural Regions.
22In an earlier version of this article, Che et al. (1998), simulated results from the linear
approximation were also decomposed between rice production in North and South Vietnam.
As might be expected, given some initial reluctance to accept market reform in the north,
the estimated growth rates vary, although not by a large amount. The growth rate in the
south is roughly 0.5 per cent larger than the north in both reform periods.
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that only observed data need be used (with the exception of the inverse of
the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution s and a clear de-
composition between static and dynamic gains from market reform is
obtained. Note ¢rst that for values of a1  0:3; z  3; g4  0:1 and s  0:5,
the ¢rst term in brackets is 0:111 and the second is 0:104. In other words, for
a given proportional increase in average per unit pro¢ts ^ t; the dynamic gain
from market reform is only slightly less than the static e¡ect.
23 It is also clear
that the static gain is much more sensitive to changes in z than is the
dynamic gain, and for good reason. Recall that z is the work-disutility
coe¤cient for e¡ort. As discussed above, an increase in z implies that work
is more `disagreeable'. The measured value of TFP or At in equation (21)
and thus static gains from reform will both be lower.
24 Variations in s show
that the dynamic e¡ect varies, but to a small extent. For variations in z it
virtually does not vary at all.
25
The rest is simple. Recall that increases in t; or higher average per unit
pro¢ts, result in an increase in e¡ort e and total factor productivity At. A
higher value for e¡ective units of labour eN increases the marginal product
of capital or the rate of return rk;t and thus induces capital accumulation.
With equations (26) and (42), the growth in rice output (Q) is given by:










^ t  ^ A0 43
where again a circum£ex represents a percentage change and A0 is now the
adjusted value of the Solow residual. In other words, the growth in rice
output now depends on the growth of labour N, land L and material inputs
E, adjusting each by a share parameter estimated from the `institutional'
production function, or the relevant g; static and dynamic output gains from
market reform and the growth in the Solow residual.
23This is consistent with the argument in Baldwin (1992), at least in terms of welfare
e¡ects, where it is claimed that dynamic e¡ect should be some fraction of the static gain. In
other words, in Baldwin (1992, p. 172), the static gain is seen as largely `for free', whereas
the dynamic gain is o¡set by the forgone consumption (and a consequent loss in welfare)
necessary to accumulate capital. However, in the model above, any welfare measure of the
static gain also depends on the `pain' associated with the extra e¡ort that goes with an
increase in average per unit pro¢ts: In this sense, the issue is more complicated.
24Numerical results for values of z at 2.6, 2.8, 3.2, 3.4, 3.6 and 3.8 imply a multiplier for
static gains of 0.130, 0.120, 0.103, 0.097, 0.091 and 0.086.
25Numerical results for values of s of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2 and 1.4, imply a multiplier
for dynamic gains of 0.108, 0.105, 0.103, 0.101, 0.098, 0.096 and 0.094. Variations in z of
from 2 to 6 imply only changes in the dynamic gains from trade from 0.101 to 0.108.
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and the value of the proportional increase in average per unit pro¢ts ^ t is
drawn from table 2. With parameter values, the measure of static and
dynamic gains (along with all other measures) is reported in table 4. For the
period of output contracts (1981^87), the values are 0.8 and 0.7 per cent
(on average) per annum, and for the trade liberalisation period, 2.3 and 2.1
per cent (on average) per annum.
26 In particular, for the period of trade
liberalisation, of the 6.1 per cent average annual growth rate from 1988 to
1994, 2.3 and 2.1 per cent are due to enhanced productivity e¡ects and
induced capital accumulation. Once again, the more extensive the degree of
market reform is, the larger the e¡ects in terms of the growth of rice output.
The measures are roughly three times larger for the period of trade liberalisa-
tion compared to output contracts in each case. Market reform and the
enhanced incentive e¡ects that it generates result in considerable output
growth.
5. Conclusion
This article has developed a dynamic model to account for the enhanced
incentive e¡ects that result from market reform. The e¡ort variable ¢gures
prominently in the analysis. Market reform and thus higher average per unit
pro¢ts generate more e¡ort and, depending on the value of the work^
disutility coe¤cient, increases in the measure of total factor productivity: In
addition, increases in e¡ort imply a higher value for the marginal product of
capital and thus induced capital accumulation. Regardless of the exact value
of the inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
dynamic gains from reform are seen to be substantial.
The model was then applied to the case of rice production for the
transitional economy of Vietnam, over the period 1976^94. The particular
focus centred on two market reform regimes, that of output contracts
(1981^87) and the period of trade liberalisation (1988^94). Empirical results
were based on estimates of all relevant parameters. Both the linear
approximation, in terms of implied rates of growth from one stage of reform
to the next, and the measures of static and dynamic gains show considerable
increases in steady-state values of rice output, capital stocks and transitional
rates of growth with reform. Moreover, the more extensive the degree of
market reform, the larger the e¡ects. All measures for the period of trade
liberalisation are substantially higher than that of output contracts, sug-
gesting that incentives and more competitive markets matter greatly.
26The values for the adjusted Solow residual or A0 are now (as expected) lower, or 0.2
for output contracts and approximately zero for the period of trade liberalisation.
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about welfare gains. Following Baldwin (1992), and given the signi¢cant
capital market distortions that exist in a transitional economy like Vietnam,
welfare gains are potentially quite large. Estimation of the magnitude of such
e¡ects would be a worthwhile extension of this article. However, an exact
welfare measure will also have to account for the e¡ects of increased levels
of e¡ort on disutility. To this end, a more precise estimate of the value of the
inverse of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution, or an indirect
inference of its value relative to the share parameter for capital, in terms of
the time series properties of the ratio of consumption to the capital stock
along a transitional path, would also be desirable.
Appendix
This appendix provides the numerical values of the log-linear approximation to



































 represent ¢rst-order variations to equations (15) and (16). Using
actual and predicted steady-state values of capital stocks in table 3 and noting that
c
=k





















To obtain general solutions, adopt trial solutions of the form kt  ae
lt and
ct  be
lt so that the underlying homogeneous system for equation (39) yields the
characteristic equation l
2 ÿ 0:01l ÿ 0:013  0 and two roots, l1  ÿ0:11 and
l2  0:12. Finally, transversality conditions (or ignoring the unstable root) give a




or equation (38) in the text.
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